

The National Security and Intelligence Nexus in Nigeria: A Historical Analysis

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ABSTRACT

Since the return to democracy in 1999, security has been a major issue in Nigeria in view of the continued ethno-religious conflicts, insurgency & terrorism, banditry, kidnappings, pipe-line vandalism and oil bunkering, sea piracy, and militancy that have continued to occur in the country. The detrimental effects of these national security challenges, has forced government and academics to direct their attention towards finding feasible solutions to Nigeria's security conundrum. A close examination of existing academic works on National security challenges in the country reveals that very little attention has been paid to the understanding of the role of intelligence as a panacea or as a catalyst that has exacerbated insecurity in the country. In light of this, this paper examines the marriage between intelligence and national security. Focusing also, on the symbiotic relationship between the two and how they both work to reinforce or undermine each other. Methodologically, the paper adopted descriptive and analytic approach. Data for the paper was sourced through the secondary means of data collection. The study reveals that in Nigeria's quest to establish sound intelligence and national security policies, it has not been able to fully take cognizance of its micro security, macro security and strategic security, and address adequately, the concerns therein. It also found out that, failure to gather intelligence comprehensively by the Nigerian intelligence services (using the full complements of their intelligence gathering paraphernalia) and also, failure to act in a timely fashion, to received intelligence, has sometimes been the reason why some violent altercations in the country have endured. Based on this, the paper recommends among others that for intelligence to be successful in reducing insecurity in Nigeria, the intelligence related services in the country, need to synergize their efforts in the promotion of Nigeria's national security strategy. Hopefully, this research study could assist various stakeholders in policy making when it comes to the application of intelligence in dealing with national security threats.

Keywords: boko haram; intelligence; insecurity; insurgency; national security

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INTRODUCTION

National security in the past primarily meant military projections. According to the conventional security paradigm, the goal of national security was to protect the nation's values, which were centred on survival, self-preservation, and self-perpetuation, as well as the pursuit of goals that aided in the nation's expansion and preeminence.

During the Cold War, both domains' national security objectives were to ward off external aggression and restrain internal unrest. Today, there is more to it and it has additional components, such as economic and ecological issues, concerns about terrorism and the spread of small/light/heavy weapons, concerns about global health, migration, changing demographics, and more. While most of the



world has come to grips with these concerns, it would seem that this has not been fully etched in Nigeria's national security psyche.

To be specific, national security is undergoing a metamorphosis. The world now speaks of human security- a more encompassing and human-centered paradigm-as opposed to national security which is state-centered and revolves around military projection. Even so, one area of Nigeria's national security we seldom discuss is the intelligence agencies. For most of Nigerians, the intelligence community is a shadowy no-go area, a forbidden topic. Indeed, for most, spies are like mystical and mythical creatures.

Often alluded to as the second oldest profession in history, intelligence has become a crucial factor in any nations foreign policy, as well as in security and defence-with Nigeria not excluded. In recent years, intelligence has gained more and more attention. This development is largely due to changes in the security environment. Intelligence constitutes a core element in the effort to tackle emerging security dilemmas like terrorism, insurgency, proliferation of small arms, banditry, organized crime and even humanitarian disasters. Detecting and assessing the so-called 'new threats' correctly requires increased proper intelligence frame. This scenario is imperative for the right responses to the new security challenges we face.

This paper therefore seeks to examine the marriage between intelligence and national security. It will highlight the symbiotic relationship between the two and how they both work to reinforce each other. In doing this it will try understand both concepts and their linkages. The paper also categorizes the security concept and based on these categories, attempts to find out the role of intelligence in enhancing these categories, particularly in the Nigerian context. It ends by proffering some sound intelligence practices to enhance national security in Nigeria.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

What is Intelligence

Shulsky (1993) postulates 'two views' of intelligence. There is, he writes, the 'traditional view,' stemming from the 6th century BC writings of Sun Tzu, that Shulsky (and others including Roy Godson and Angelo Codevilla) advocate. Intelligence is seen primarily in military or national security terms, as part of the 'silent warfare' between nations and consisting of four basic elements: collection, analysis, covert action and counterintelligence. The emphasis is on espionage, covert action, counterintelligence and deception as well as 'opportunity analysis.' From that definition comes the belief that the Intelligence Community should stick to collecting and analyzing the secrets of adversaries. Note that Shulsky's definition is prescriptive rather descriptive. That is, it advocates the way he believes the intelligence community ought to operate. But it differs from the way intelligence actually functions today.

Reduced to its simplest terms, intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us. Intelligence organizations provide this information in a fashion that helps consumers, either civilian leaders or military commanders, to consider alternative options and outcomes. The intelligence process involves the painstaking and generally tedious collection of facts, their analysis, quick and clear evaluations, production of intelligence assessments, and their timely dissemination to consumers. Above all, the analytical process must be rigorous, timely, and relevant to policy needs and concerns.

Gillen (2003) goes further and captures it succinctly, he says, "'Intelligence' is merely knowledge. As with beauty, its worth lies in the eye of the beholder. The value of a particular bit of information depends on who knows it, who knows which others also know it, when it was learned, what other bits of related info are also known, and what the knowers can do with it".

However, defining intelligence and differentiating it from mere information is not an easy task. In the broadest sense, intelligence can be understood as processed information aimed at assisting a certain receiver's decision making (Hughes, 2011). What turns information into intelligence often lies in the eye of the beholder. In a security context, intelligence assists the receiver in identifying threats, i.e., it helps him or her to become aware of the necessity to take action. In addition, it supports him or her during planning and execution of field operations or policy actions.

One decision-maker may regard certain information as intelligence, because it serves his or her needs, while another considers it to be raw data and mere information.

Categorization of Functions of Intelligence

Military Intelligence: Collects and assesses information on actual and potential activities of foreign military forces within and outside its own territory. National agencies producing this kind of intelligence are in general, placed under the authority of the Ministry of defence.

Security Intelligence Surveys: (domestic) threats targeting the governmental functions defined in the Constitution (or equivalent). It is, amongst other things, engaged in surveying counter-espionage, 'left-wing' and 'right wing' extremism and terrorism

Criminal Intelligence: Engages in the fight against serious and organized crime. It differs from other functions in the respect that it is linked to criminal investigations, which aim at producing evidence that can result in conviction in a court of law

External or foreign Intelligence: Focuses on the development in foreign countries. It supports decision making on foreign policy in general and produces situation assessments on issues in the field of security, defence, foreign and economic policies.

1. Security

The term or special word 'security' is often used to imply safety, or freedom from danger and protection from external attack or infiltration. It is also a state of mind of the individual that is confidently secure of his/her well-being. To Eze and Hettmann (2005), security is defined as the defence, policing and intelligence functions of states, and the management of threats to and breaches of the peace through multilateral and bilateral processes

McNamara (1968) argued that "in a modernizing society, security means development and without development there can be no security. A developing nation that does not develop, simply cannot remain secure for the intractable reason that its own citizenry cannot shed its human nature". It therefore needs to be stated that security must be appreciated from both the military and non-military dimensions; hence it denotes the security of citizens as well as the state that provides opportunities for the well being of citizens.

2. National Security

The term 'national security', ordinarily, conjures a perception of comprehensive defence of a country against a myriad of both internal and external threats in ways that inspires confidence of the citizens (Walsh, 2020). It can be taken as the aggregation of the safety of all individuals, communities, ethnic groups, political entities and institutions that inhabit the territory of a country. Onovo (2005) noted that "a secured nation state is one that is able to protect and develop itself so that it can maintain its core values, meet the needs of its peoples and provide them with the right atmosphere for self-improvement". To Obasanjo (2003), "the primary objective of national security shall be to contain instability, control crime, eliminate corruption, enhance genuine development, progress and growth, improve the welfare and well-being and quality of life of every citizen". Clearly, national security is construed in terms of the

sum total of a country's effort to promote, preserve and maintain itself, its core values, contain instability, enhance development, thereby boosting the welfare, well-being and quality of life of the citizens by enhancing consumption patterns.

In essence, the terms "security" and "intelligence" mean: Secure, free from danger, free from dread or doubt, not likely to fail or give way, steady, confident, and certain—anything that gives or promises safety. While "intelligence" refers to the capacity to learn and use knowledge, news, a hidden piece of information, especially regarding an enemy, and an organisation tasked with gathering such information, are all examples of information..

Effectually, a country's national security, in conjunction with its intelligence programmes, frequently becomes the lynchpin of the success or failure of the administration functioning under those policies. For instance, regardless of whether political party is in power, the United States of America and Britain have consistently maintained continuity on issues pertaining to their national security.

To establish sound intelligence and national security policies, it is therefore important to look thoroughly and eliminate all nuances that are considered inimical to the country. In doing so, the paper would like to examine security from the following categories as postulated by Gbanite (2002), they are: Micro Security, Macro Security, and Strategic Security.

Categorization of Security

1. Micro Security

Public safety is a topic covered by micro security. Stabilising internal and external security is the first step in micro security. The government will inherit a rise in foreign investments when individuals' rights to safety from all types of man-made hazards are significantly diminished.

2. Macro Security

The Macro Security is the following level of security, as previously said. Macro is the total comprehension of the ECOWAS region. Our Macro Security (region of concentration).

3. Strategic Security

The last aspect of national security, referred to as strategic by Gbanite (2002), goes beyond the ECOWAS countries. This applies both globally and throughout Africa. The Strategic Security heavily relies on economic support and bilateral trade agreements that open their market for products made in Nigeria.

Security Categorization in Nigerian Context

Micro-Security- In this case or scenario, the Nigerian state is confronted with the following questions: Have we been able to stem the state of lawlessness in the country? and; Why are we faced with the aggressive posturing of militant groups, banditry, paid assassins, fuel distribution and oil pipeline sabotage, kidnappings, human/drug trafficking, advance fee fraud (419), unemployment, and high price of commodities?- the aforementioned, are all realities being faced in the country that require urgent remediation. For instance, the country has been bedeviled by a tidal wave of bandits and insurgent groups. A case in point is the Boko Haram and the ISWASP sects. These sects have been a torn in the flesh of security forces. At times, when these sects have struck, particularly the Boko Haram sect, the verdict in most cases has been, not so much the failure of intelligence, but its misuse. The question now that we must ask ourselves, is what is being done to correct this anomaly, if indeed, this has been the norm.

A couple of years ago, there was this bomb blast on Nigeria's Independence day, that killed a number of citizens. The reports that were circulated then, was that the security agencies were informed beforehand of a plot to disrupt the independence day activities. The issue then was, how did the security

agencies handle this report or intelligence, and could they have been able to avert what happened on the 1st of October, 2010.

Macro-Security- At this level, the questions that seem critical and poignant for the Nigerian nation are: Have we been able to stretch our influence in the West African sub-region?; Have we been able to influence the leadership of countries in this region?; Are their markets opened up for goods made in Nigeria?; Have we been able to persuade the leaders of nations in the sub-region to follow our ideology of free trade, fairness, and, above all, peace and internal stability?; and are we paying attention to the developments in our concentric region of West Africa?. Essentially, it should be our concern, the domestic and international policies our neighbouring countries adopt and also, the kind of international relations they keep.

Strategic Security- Here, the Nigerian state, is faced with this main poser; how are we influencing African nations and the G-8 nations, and the former east-bloc nations to open up their markets for products made in Nigeria? We must know that our Strategic Security lies on economic support and bilateral trade agreements that open up their markets to Nigerian goods and services. Again, there has always been a congregation of actors and powers around the Gulf of Guinea, seeking to gain control of our most prized possession-oil- are our intelligence and security agencies empowered to collate and analyze intelligence data to give Nigeria an added advantage in handling those powers? At this point, it would be crucial to see how the current realities of Nigeria's security terrain has affected or been affected by intelligence.

Current Realities of Nigeria's Security Terrain

No doubt, over the past decade, the internal security landscape of Nigeria has been dominated by numerous threats mainly occasioned by activities of non-state actors. Nigeria recorded the greatest security challenge to its national security from 2009 till date as manifested in the activities of the Boko Haram Terrorist (BHT) Group and their affiliates such as the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP). The terror activities of the BHT which is predominantly in the North Eastern part of the country has led to the loss of numerous lives and properties and casualties to government security agencies.

Relatedly, are the activities of secessionists groups like the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) and the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) in the South East as well as other similarly related groups in the South West who have resorted to armed struggle and criminality to disrupt public peace, order and tranquility. Also dominating our contemporary security environment are the activities of other organized criminal groups like the armed bandits whose activities are manifested in the form of kidnapping, insurgency, cattle rustling, arson and wanton destruction of lives and property amongst other nefarious activities

Clearly, the Nigerian security environment is bedeviled by various threats that have compounded the existing security situation. To put things in the right perspective, this research shall try to throw more light on them, and they are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

Insurgency. Insurgency is a violent attempt to oppose a country's government carried out by citizens of that country. It is historically restricted to rebellious acts that did not reach the proportions of an organized revolution. In Nigeria, insurgency came into limelight with the activities of the insurgent group Jamm'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wal-Jihad popularly referred to as Boko Haram Terrorists (BHT) in 2009. Activities of the sect initially commenced in Borno State, but subsequently extended to the North-Eastern States of Yobe and Adamawa and afterwards other parts of the country and neighbouring countries. Since the inception of the BHT insurgency, it has claimed a lot of lives and properties. It is estimated by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs that more than 30,000 people have been killed and about 3 million people displaced as a result of the BHT terror activities in Nigeria

(UNDP Report, 2021). BHT violent activities have largely undermined human security as well as posed a significant challenge to security forces around the country.

It has to be said that, a major issue with the curbing of insurgency in Nigeria, has to do with intelligence gathering. Indeed, it is expected that all of the tools for gathering intelligence, including Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Image Intelligence (IMINT), and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), should have been heavily used by the Nigerian security agencies at the time of collection (William & Blum, 2018). This is due to the fact that many efficient intelligence organisations sponsor or maintain teams or persons whose primary mission is to conduct espionage or interrogation operations in order to gather information from specific target regions of interest. Additionally, intelligence organisations routinely listen in on the entire radio spectrum and interpret it in real time. Local military traffic, radar emissions, and even microwaved telephone and telegraph communication, including satellite traffic, are frequently used to do this. A great deal of useful intelligence can also be gathered from photo-interpretation of detailed high-altitude pictures (drone or satellite imagery) of a target area. However, all these have proved a challenge, due to the interplay of inadequate intelligence facilities and human sabotage.

While it is clear that the Nigerian government is making progress in terms of combatting insurgency, this progress is often easily reversed due to inadequate and ineffective intelligence gathering. At worse, it can be said that the old way of gathering and handling intelligence information by the security agencies may have been compromised and there is the need for a new approach.

Herdsmen Farmers Clashes. Herder-farmer conflicts in Nigeria are mainly influenced by disputes over land and/or cattle between herders and farmers. These clashes are predominant along the ancestral cattle routes which herdsmen ply to enable their cattle graze in relation to climatic changes. Available reports indicated that the most impacted are the North Central states such as Benue, Taraba, Nasarawa and Plateau states. Herders-farmers clash is a significant security threat as it has resulted in the loss of lives and properties and in some instances the destruction of communities. It has also resulted in revenge killings as well as the attack of security personnel. For instance, in 5 Apr 21, one officer and 11 soldiers deployed in the Konshisha LGA of Benue State were killed in an ambushed. Additionally, it is estimated that there have been more than 654 attacks with 2,539 people killed and 253 people kidnapped in the herders-farmers crisis between 2017 and 2020 in Nigeria according to ThisDay Live newspaper (ThisDay, 2021).

No doubt, the Herder-Farmer conflict, has been a scourge in Nigeria's security terrain, and seems to be defying all attempts at stopping it. However, in several quarters, community policing, has been suggested as a panacea to the Herder-Farmer Conflict. The thinking is that, by leveraging on the already existing vigilante system in most local communities in Nigeria, it will help in intelligence gathering about the conflict while the civil police would respond to such threats. This will help address the challenges of waiting for the federal government to deploy security forces to states, when there is conflict.

Armed Robbery. Armed robbery which involves the use of weapons to threaten or force and deprive an individual of the right to his/her private or public belonging is another security threat in Nigeria. Since the end of the Civil War which took place between 1967-1970, armed robbery has become a major security risk which occurs almost on a daily basis predominantly in urban areas compared to rural ones. Armed robbery takes place in residential homes, commercial places, motorways and any other place the offender deems necessary to operate. The current criminal climate has also made it possible for armed robbers to engage in interstate criminal operations. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, in 2019 alone there were 13,278 cases of armed robbery reported with about 15,719 people arrested (NBS Report, 2019). Armed robbery is a crime that has reached an epidemic level causing instability, negatively

affecting the ease of doing business and a threat to the security environment. Also, in this case of armed robbery, it has to be said that, the security services usually respond to these crimes slowly, if at all, and provide little or no investigative support to victims"(Pike, 2012).

Cattle Rustling. Cattle rustling occurs when a group of individuals plan, organize and steal livestock forcefully from another person or from the grazing field or kraal for the purpose of commercial gain. Initially it was carried out as a cultural practice. However, it is now being carried out as a form of organized crime with links to international criminal networks in the contemporary security environment. Traditionally, small scale stock theft was a way of balancing community wealth and power but crime occasioned by wide spread poverty has led to the commercialization of the practice thereby making it a significant economic threat. This is more challenging as it has led to the death or maiming of citizens especially in the rural areas as well as attacks on security personnel. Cattle rustling has also been linked to terrorism and banditry as it serves as a form of funding for their illicit activities. As at Jan 21, it was reported that attacks have led to the loss of about 2 million cattle and the death of about 600 herders (The Guardian, 2021). It has however been observed that, intelligence gathering is a very vital component in reducing cattle rustling-this is a strategy used extensively, by security agencies in other climes. However the gathering of information related to cattle rustling has been hampered by communal disharmony. The gathering of information that could lead to the arrest and prosecution of the suspects has also been made difficult by lack of co-operation from citizens in the communes.

Illegal Bunkering and Crude Oil Theft. Illegal bunkering is the unlawful transfer of fuels and other petroleum products between vessels, from storage facilities to vessels and vice versa. Crude oil theft (COT) involves pipeline vandalism and subsequent theft of the products from the pipes. Illegal bunkering and COT as security threats complicate the security situation mainly in the nation's maritime domain. The Niger Delta region alone has an estimated 1,650 km in length of oil pipelines (Balint-Kurti, 2003). Crude Oil is influential to the economics security of Nigeria and a major source of revenue. COT has been identified as Nigeria's greatest maritime threat at present. It is estimated that Nigeria loses about USD 5 million daily to COT, illegal bunker and pipeline vandalism (ThisDay, 2022). More worrisome, pipeline vandalism has led to environmental degradation, which affects the livelihood of farmers, and the Country's food production in the long run.

It has to be said that, crude oil theft is a significant challenge in Nigeria, and tackling it requires a systematic and bespoke approach involving various stakeholders. There is need to articulate appropriate strategies to address this economic malady. Recognising that addressing crude oil theft requires a multi-faceted and sustained effort involving government agencies, law enforcement, communities, and international partners is crucial. Combining these strategies with continuous monitoring, evaluation, and adaptation of approaches can significantly reduce crude oil theft in Nigeria. Clearly, activities such as enhancing security measures in oil-producing regions are crucial. This includes increasing patrols, establishing dedicated security forces, and more importantly, deploying technology, such as surveillance systems and drones to monitor pipelines and oil infrastructure-increased intelligence sharing, would also be crucial in efforts to combat oil theft

Piracy and Sea Robbery. Piracy is an illegal act committed for private mostly pecuniary ends by the crew of a ship against another ship at high sea while sea robbery is an act with similar motive however, committed within territorial waters of a coastal state. Nigeria's waters was reported to have experienced the highest number of piracy/sea robbery globally in 2018. Piracy is also a major threat to Nigeria's economic security and global image. This is because it negatively impacts the inflow of shipping, foreign direct investment and the integrity of Nigeria's national security. Maritime security analysts believe that the same gangs responsible for sea robbery are more than likely the same groups

responsible for militancy in the Niger Delta. The ease at which pirates maneuver on land, highlights weak intelligence and surveillance around the coastal areas. It also highlights the need for better community policing in the region.

Trans-national/Organized Crimes. Due to the fact that these illegal acts cross borders, they deserve special attention. Unlike traditional crimes, which are committed inside Nigeria's internal territory and pose no threat to the nation's sovereignty, or national security crimes, which are committed over state lines. Cybercrime, the use of fake drugs, the sale of illegal items, the use of drugs and other substances that are prohibited, the sale of illegal weapons, human trafficking, and money laundering are some examples.

Multilateral Security Cooperation Intelligence gathering in the twenty-first century has been profoundly affected by the still-evolving dynamics of globalisation, according to a 2006 Op-Ed in the Daily Trust Newspaper. Frontiers are eroding as a result of globalization's effects on the internet, e-commerce, sophisticated satellite communication systems, and other factors. Globalisation has not only created new security issues for intelligence agencies, but it has also given previously weak threats newfound vigour (Daily Trust, 2006). In fact, cross-border crimes are now performed with more efficiency and anonymity. Modern science has given people, including terrorists, new strategic relevance. Today's threats recognize no national boundaries, and must be addressed at the global, regional, and national levels. No state, no matter how powerful, can claim to have the capacity to confront these threats alone" (Daily Trust, 2006). The level of sophistication involved in this type of crime varies, depending on the crime involved. For most of the crimes that fall within this category, except probably cybercrime, the point of contact with the criminals is at the borders. The porosity at the borders makes having the right level of intelligence coordination, a challenge and policing this kind of offences really difficult.

In order to combat transnational crimes, airport security personnel, customs officers, members of the National Drugs Law Enforcement Agency, customs services, the Nigerian Immigration Service, the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control, the Nigeria Police, and others can be seen at airports and other established borders, making sure that criminal activity does not go unnoticed. These law enforcement officers are presumably unaware of other unlawful borders, though. However, blocking, looking into, or prosecuting cybercrimes or other transnational/organized crimes is not something that all law enforcement agencies are very good at. Furthermore, several other organised crime types, such money laundering, are impossible to catch at the borders. This is due to the employment of information technology in these crimes' commission and execution. The nature of the Internet infrastructure in Nigeria (and most other countries in the world) is such that there is no gateway where law enforcement officers can man to prevent traffic of information bits.

Basically in Nigeria, security and intelligence are handled by several authorities and organisations, as already alluded to. Depending on the crime in question and the people involved, the agency in charge at any one time would vary. Additionally, depending on where in the nation the crime is committed, a different procedure would be used. Determining the major security organisations that would likely address all of the security concerns discussed above would be crucial. For context, it will be crucial at this point to briefly describe some of these intelligence related agencies.

Nigeria's Intelligence Related Agencies

1. The Nigeria Police Force (NPF)

The Police Act created the Nigeria Police Force. Section 4 of the Act outlines their responsibilities and authority. They work to prevent and identify crime, apprehend offenders, maintain peace and order, safeguard lives and property, and properly implement the laws and regulations with which they are

specifically tasked. They may carry out any military obligations within or outside of Nigeria that they may be obliged to as part of additional obligations imposed by the Act and other applicable laws and regulations.

2. Force Criminal Investigations Department (FCID) and the Federal Investigations and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB)

The Force Criminal Investigations Department (FCID) and the Federal Investigations and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) are two investigative divisions of the Nigerian police. The FCID conducts inquiries and brings complicated crimes both domestically and abroad to justice. To assist other police units, the FIIB conducts intelligence collection and monitoring.

3. Department of State Services (DSS)

The DSS, sometimes known as the SSS, was established in 1986 and reports directly to the National Security Advisor (NSA). It oversees domestic intelligence and makes sure the nation's security is not jeopardised. The DSS is also given the authority to eradicate "national threats" and to protect important government figures and foreign dignitaries.

4. Joint Intelligence Board (JIB)

The JIB was established by the Federal Military Government in 1986 to supervise all intelligence operations. In order to fulfill General Babangida's vow to restructure Nigeria's security apparatus, this exercise was undertaken. Three new intelligence agencies were established when the former National Security Organisation was abolished. They are the Defence Intelligence Agency, the National Intelligence Agency, and the State Security Service. In order to communicate with other intelligence agencies, the FIIB was established within the Nigeria Police Force structure. The JIB was founded under the National Security Adviser's office, which was established by the same Decree.

The Joint Intelligence Board receives intelligence that has been gathered and analysed by these other organisations. The JIB then compiles this data and provides it to Nigeria's highest security body, the National Security Council. As the nation's Chief Security Officer, the President chairs the National Security Council. As a result, he is aware of the information obtained and is in charge of making the final judgments.

5. National Intelligence Agency (NIA)

International intelligence is gathered by the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), which is a part of the NSA. It was established in 1986 and is in charge of counterintelligence and foreign intelligence. It compiles outside intelligence to safeguard Nigeria's security interests away from its borders.

6. Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)

The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), which was founded in 1986 to offer an effective method of gathering military intelligence for the Armed Forces, is also another intelligence related agency. The DIA focuses on military intelligence, in contrast to the NIA and SSS, which are more concerned with domestic civilian intelligence than with foreign ties between Nigeria and other nations.

7. Defence Military Intelligence (DMI)

There are other agencies that have intelligence roles. The military services have their own intelligence outfits. The Ministry of External Affairs produces intelligence. However, these exist primarily to service departmental requirements, but they do have inputs into the national and defence intelligence process. For example, the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI). The DMI is charged with the following functions: collection of information, processing of information, i. e. collation, evaluation, interpretation, to convert it into intelligence, dissemination of intelligence in a suitable form in tune for it to be of use to

those who need it, and training of intelligence and observation of members of the Armed Forces of Nigeria.

No doubt, the number of agencies enumerated above, should cover the length and breadth, and be able to deal with the security challenges espoused in this paper-however, it would seem there are still loopholes. For instance, thousands of Nigerians and foreigners are still engaged in illegal oil deals and in other crimes- including white-collar crimes; yet, it appears there is no way of stopping these activities before they happen. Which begs the questions; what then are the duties and responsibilities of the intelligence and security agencies? What are the duties of these agencies vis-à-vis transnational terrorism, transnational armed robbery, transnational prostitution and cross-border child-trafficking?

Towards Improving Intelligence for National Security

Academically speaking, national security is a complex web of defence mechanisms designed to ensure the safety of governments, the state, and its citizens. The security of the people, their state, and their governments is secured through overt and covert measures of military intelligence operations, undercover disruptions of the nefarious actions of men and women with misplaced consciences, and other means. Various techniques, such as infiltration, intrigue, subterfuge, deception, harsh tactics, wiretapping, defensive intelligence, and military action, are utilised in security operations.

Political, military, and strategic elements of intelligence exist, and they are linked to security, statecraft, and governance. Every sovereign, independent nation must develop the men and women who will work in its security and intelligence units. In Europe and America, these are selected from the best and the brightest citizens, who are endowed with keen and subtle intellect. They are the anchor of state security. As a result, recruitment into military intelligence and defence organisations requires meticulous evaluation of the recruit's intellectual acuity, intelligence, and patriotism. Graduates with the best grades should be deployed not those, who got ranks by federal character. Recently, there was failure of military intelligence in the Mangu Local Government, Communal Crisis in Plateau State. The system of early detection failed. A corps of strategic, street-corner operatives would have detected the movement of armed men into the affected villages. What system is now in place to protect the nation from bomb detonators, angry and hungry youths, failed politicians, who are bitter and are ready to use the unwaried young drop-outs for their political ends?

What we must know is that, our national security strategy should be driving our national efforts and goals, it should be a catalyst to our national interest. Where do we want to go, where do we need to be and where should we be? These are issues we need to ponder over.

As drivers of the process, how have the intelligence agencies/services in the country, been able to synergise their efforts in the promotion of national security strategy-do the philosophies of their various organizations add value to Nigeria's national security. In these matters, it will be important to take a look at the Bomb blast at the Force Headquarters, some years back-where was intelligence. Intelligence would have made us know that given the brazenness of these groups, it would not have been wise to dismiss their threats out right, to attack the complex or the I-G-inadequate measures should have been put in place to counter these threats. Here, definite intelligence about their modus operandi, would have helped the situation and furthered national security.

For the intelligentsia, their role is to anticipate the unforeseen-using good intelligence-and put in place measures to counter them. But in anticipating, they must be able to identify the threats and nature of threat. They must view the threat as a living organism that thrives in our insecurity. In fighting the threat they must understand its evolution, in order to attack the roots. Without good intelligence, it would be impossible to do all these things.

Again, it is also important to understand why some threats remain, inspite of all our best efforts. Oil bunkering for instance, remains a security threat-here, we may want to assume that intelligence about the perpetrators of these acts have failed- or is it a systemic failure?-if we agree that it is the latter, then our national security strategy should be focused on plugging the loop holes in the system that propagate it. It is important to note however that, intelligence fails and negates national security, when we are unwilling to act-having the right intelligence is not enough-acting on the right intelligence is what really matters in the end.

It is clear that to curb or control these security problems, the country requires commitment from security personnel and financial mobilization to strengthen all the security agencies. The National Security Agency (NSA) must have clear and achievable objectives on how to keep this country safe. The objectives as envisaged by NSA, must be articulated to the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), State Security Service (SSS), Nigeria Police Force (NPF), and Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA). The defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) should coordinate the efforts of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), Directorate of Naval Intelligence Agency (DNIA), and the Directorate of Airforce Intelligence (DAI). Any and all information gathered that may be considered a threat to the stability of our country, be it from afar or within, must be shared with NSA for passage to the proper agency authorized to checkmate such insurgency.

Discussion of this Study

Here, we focus on the overall impact or relationship between intelligence and national security in Nigeria. Thus, the study considers the literature reviewed. Basically, the conceptual relationship is that improvement in the employment of intelligence would lead to better handling of the security challenges in Nigeria. In the work of William & Blum (2018), they sort of allude to this, however, their emphasis on intelligence gathering (as there are other equally important aspects of intelligence) as the key to dealing with insurgency in Nigeria's North East, is, in my view, rather limiting of the issue. At the same time, Gbanite's (2002) categorization of intelligence, even if addressing some of the other salient aspects of national security, like the economy, does not fully or specifically, help us understand how to reduce the tide of violent eruptions in Nigeria-using the instrumentality of intelligence. While the works in this study addressed salient aspects of national security and intelligence, they were silent on how the effective application of the full spectrum of intelligence, can significantly reduce insecurity in Nigeria. This paper has thus, tried to cover that gap.

CONCLUSION

Finally, it should be noted then that, when gathering intelligence, it should be for the overall good of the national security objective (which also forms part of a nation's national security strategy)-intelligence should be to achieve national security goals/objectives. What this portends then, is that, nations should have clearly defined national security objectives, which should be privy or well known to the intelligence gatherer and the intelligence recipient. Ultimately, this will dictate the way intelligence is gathered and how it is eventually used or applied.

As it is now, Nigeria has a well-crafted national security strategy in place. However, the critical issue is, were are we in terms intellectual capacity and requisite knowledge to evolve a credible process that allows for that national security strategy, to be fully implemented-and its impact, felt in Nigeria's security terrain. Have we been able to tame our security terrain? At this stage, it would seem uppermost that we are seriously and effectively instituting, all the necessary and important measures and

mechanisms that ensure, we have a credible and functional national security strategy, given the issues raised thus far.

No doubt, Intelligence, in its proper form, is still in its infancy in Nigeria-and, it is hoped that research-wise, this study would have served as a source of information and stimulate further discussions on the matter. That apart, it must be emphasized that, no matter the nature and structure of the intelligence community, its primary purpose is to assist governments in the policy and decision making process. In other words: the intelligence agencies exist to do one thing and one thing only: assist the government in the furtherance of its domestic and foreign policy objectives.

Recommendations

- a) Nigeria should have clearly defined national security objectives, which should be privy or well known to the intelligence gatherers and the intelligence recipient's or relevant stakeholders;
- b) There is need for the relevant security agencies to improve their intellectual capacity and requisite knowledge to effectively implement Nigeria's national security strategy; and
- c) There is need for Nigeria to seriously and effectively institute, all the necessary and important measures and mechanisms that ensure, a credible and functional national security strategy

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